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What Good Is Religious Freedom?
Locke, Rand, and the Non-Religious Case for
Respecting It
Tara Smith ∗
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.” Justice Robert Jackson 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom is in the limelight. In recent years,
religiously inspired violence has slaughtered thousands around
the world and provoked calls for the repression of adherents of
various faiths. 2 Domestically, we have shrill debates: Should
bakers be compelled to serve at gay weddings when they have
religious objections to doing so? 3 Should government officials
be compelled to facilitate gay marriages when they have religious

∗
I am grateful to Onkar Ghate, Steve Simpson, Greg Salmieri, Robert Mayhew, and
Kevin Douglas for helpful discussion as I formulated many of the ideas addressed in the
paper, and to my Research Assistants Sam Krauss, Simone Gubler, and Zach Blaesi.
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jehovah’s
Witnesses objected to compulsory Pledge of Allegiance).
2. Tom Heneghan, Religious Violence Across World Hits Six Year High According to
Pew
Study,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
23,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/14/religious-violence-pewsurvey_n_4596169.html [https://perma.cc/8QLS-J89X].
3. See John Corvino, “Bake Me a Cake”: Three Paths for Balancing Liberty
and Equality, WHAT’S WRONG? THE NOT QUITE OFFICIAL BLOG OF CU-BOULDER’S CTR.
FOR VALUES & SOC. POL’Y (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://whatswrongcvsp.com/2015/10/15/guest-post-from-john-corvino-bake-me-a-cakethree-paths-for-balancing-liberty-and-equality/ [https://perma.cc/F4Z6-8XPE] (concerning
Sweet Cakes by Melissa, a bakery in Oregon that was fined for refusing to bake a wedding
cake for a gay couple, in violation of the state’s equality laws); Eric Eckholm, Baker Who
Denied Cake to Gay Couple Loses Appeal, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2015, at A15 (describing
a similar case in Colorado).
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objections to doing so? 4 Should employers have to provide
workers with medical insurance for practices that they disapprove
of on religious grounds? 5 Prayer at town meetings, 6 zoning
exemptions for church property, 7 embryonic stem cell research, 8
workplace dress codes, 9 beards on prisoners, 10 recognition of
religious organizations at state universities 11—a stream of
contentious battles seems to pit religious freedom against equal
protection. 12 The liberation of some, many charge, is coming at
the expense of others (e.g., his freedom to marry versus her
freedom to practice her faith). Each side digs in—some with
lawsuits, others with legislation. In 2015 alone, eighty-seven
religious refusal bills were introduced in twenty-eight states. 13
The aim of this paper is to step back from these controversies
so as to consider the larger value at stake. Its question: What

4. See Alan Blinder and Richard Perez-Pena, Kentucky Clerk Defies Justices on
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2015, at A1.
5. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
6. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014).
7. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012); Jess Bravin, Church Turns to Higher Authority in Zoning Battle,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2011, at A1.
8. Federal funding for such research was cut back, amidst controversy, by President
George W. Bush. See Mark Hanson, Religion and Stem Cell Research, U. OF MONT.: CTR.
OF ETHICS, http://www.umt.edu/ethics/imx/radioessays/comment_religionandstemcells.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ESQ3-DF6J].
9. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015); Mitchell v. McCall,
143 So. 2d 629, 630 (Ala. 1962).
10. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015); cf. Fraternal Order of Police Newark
Lodge # 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (regarding a police
department’s policy requiring officers to shave their beards); Tara Bahrampour, Police Force
Eases Its Dress Code for Sikh Officers, WASH. POST, May 17, 2012, at B5 (regarding a
Washington D.C. police department policy that allows officers to wear beards and religious
headgear).
11. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668 (2010) (concerning Hastings
College of Law); S. Alan Ray, How Religion and Rights Align on Campus, CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 15, 2014, at A56.
12. These are merely a sample. See generally CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER &
LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (discussing the
conflicts that are created as freedom of religion is expanded); MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD
VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d ed. 2014) (discussing
the issues created by increasing religious liberty through the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act); Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (discussing the expansion of protection for religious organizations
at both the federal and state level).
13. Katherine Stewart, Ted Cruz and the Anti-Gay Pastor: Commentary, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2015, at A23.
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good is religious freedom? Why is it valuable? What is the source
of its goodness and what is the benefit of respecting it? What
does religious freedom add to a properly governed society?
I am not a religious believer, yet I regard religious freedom
as a critical component of a proper legal system. What religious
freedom is, however, is widely misunderstood in contemporary
debate; it does not entail all of the protections that many profess. 14
My aim is to shed light on what religious freedom properly means
and protects by examining its foundations. Only with a sound
understanding of these can we establish its scope and justly
resolve the endless disputes over its application. Basically, we
cannot know what religious freedom protects until we know why
it protects—the reasons for respecting religious freedom, in the
first place. Getting the foundations right is critical to getting the
legal rights right.
Unfortunately, the reigning accounts of religious freedom
tend to be superficial and subjectivist. The operative thinking,
evidenced in perennial calls for “balance” and the increasing
reliance on exemptions, 15 is roughly the following: “Different
people want different things and there’s no getting them to agree.
We should accept that as our starting point and simply work out
reasonable compromises to accommodate various parties’
demands.” While it may seem easier to settle for such pragmatic
solutions, in the long run, this approach actually diminishes
religious freedom—and all freedom—for it treats individual
rights not as inviolable claims, but as tokens for barter, with
government simply coordinating the horse-trading. The result is
that no rights are secure.

14. For an argument against religious exemptions in particular, see generally Tara
Smith, Religious Liberty or Religious License? Legal Schizophrenia and the Case Against
Exemptions, 32 J.L. & POL. 43, 47-58 (2016) (arguing that religious exemptions destroy the
impartiality of the legal system).
15. See Dahlia Lithwick, Conscience Creep: What’s so Wrong With Conscience
Clauses?,
SLATE
(Oct.
3,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/is_there_a_princip
led_way_to_respond_to_the_proliferation_of_conscience.html
[https://perma.cc/6D7984Y5]; Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518-19 (2015)
(documenting the particular rise in claims seeking exemptions from laws requiring a person’s
complicity in sin—as distinguished from direct commission of sin).
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To understand the objective value of religious freedom, I
will draw on the neglected insights of John Locke and others. 16
Although the Lockean defense has been sharply criticized and
widely dismissed (notably, by Brian Leiter and Jeremy Waldron),
it is actually quite instructive. 17 While Locke’s argument is
admittedly deficient in certain respects, it raises the kind of
consideration that points to the truer foundations of religious
freedom and, correspondingly, offers its most secure protection.
The Lockean case revolves around the nature of human belief. 18
Essentially, it contends that belief cannot be physically coerced. 19
Building on Locke, I draw further on Ayn Rand’s
explanation of rights to show that the problem is not that religion
cannot be served by force, as the Lockeans lament (true though
that is). More deeply, force prevents autonomous reasoning and
the attainment of knowledge—knowledge about any subject,
religious or other. What we will find, therefore, is that religion is
not special, for the purposes of a proper legal system; it warrants
no special treatment qua religion. Religious freedom, however,
is special; it is a vital right that must be respected. My broader
thesis is that religious freedom is valuable because intellectual
freedom is valuable. Intellectual freedom is valuable because it
is the prerequisite of rational thought and human knowledge,
along with all the further values that these make possible. Thus
respect for religious freedom is part and parcel of the proper
respect of intellectual freedom, which is valuable for all of us,
religious and non-religious alike.
The plan is as follows. In Part II, I will explain the Lockean
argument 20 on behalf of religious freedom. Locke and others
presented a mind-focused account of religious freedom. That is,
even while most of them were concerned to protect the religious

16. Their arguments are not entirely neglected. See Ryan Pevnick, The Lockean Case
for Religious Tolerance: The Social Contract and the Irrationality of Persecution, 57 POL.
STUD. 846, 846-47 (2009).
17. See BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 10-12 (2013); Jeremy Waldron,
Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION:
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 61-64 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988).
18. PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE IDEA OF THE STATE 154 (2004).
19. GLEN NEWEY, TOLERATION IN POLITICAL CONFLICT 108 (2013).
20. I will use “Lockean argument” to include others who share his basic view and not
the views strictly of Locke alone. I see Rand as broadly within this tradition, but because I
also emphasize new extensions that Rand offered, I will later contrast her view with the firstwave Lockeans. Also, I use “freedom” and “liberty” interchangeably, throughout.
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beliefs of a particular sect (such as Lutheranism or Anglicanism),
their defense of religious freedom fastened on the mechanics of a
person’s adoption of a religious belief rather than the content of
particular creeds. “How does a person come to believe
anything?” they asked, “and what does that believing consist of?”
In Part III, I will recount the reigning critique of the Lockean
line. Essentially, the critics contend that the Lockean portrait of
belief and of coercion’s power to affect belief is naïve. Religious
dictators’ use of force is more effective than Lockeans appreciate.
The core of my argument will come in Part IV as I respond
to this critique by examining the deeper foundations of religious
freedom. This argument falls into three main segments. First,
and most substantially, I will draw on Rand to tease out precisely
what the instruments of force can and cannot accomplish in
influencing a person’s beliefs. Second, given that many people
cite the First Amendment as the source of religious freedom, I
will consider the Amendment’s broader context and relation to
the basic function of government to explain how these bear on
freedom of the mind. Finally, having seen the strong affinities
between Locke’s and Rand’s arguments, I will underscore the
ways in which Rand’s analysis develops and differs from the
Lockeans’. Doing so will sharpen our understanding of both and
deepen our grasp of the value of religious freedom.
Again, it is not only the religious who should be concerned
with religious freedom. Because religious freedom is simply one
form of intellectual freedom, as we shall see, and because
intellectual freedom is crucial to human well-being, we all have
reason to understand the good of religious freedom.

II. THE LOCKEAN ARGUMENT: CONVICTION BY
“LIGHT AND EVIDENCE”
John Locke, along with several others before and since, 21
offered an important, vastly underappreciated defense of religious
freedom. The Lockeans argued that government should not seek
to control people’s religious beliefs because doing so is
impossible. 22 Belief is not the kind of thing that force can
manipulate. A government rules through laws. The physical
means of law enforcement, however, (such devices as handcuffs,
21. I will name a few of the others shortly. See infra Part II.
22. NEWEY, supra note 19.
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clubs, guns, prison walls) are not capable of bringing about
intellectual ends. Physical means cannot deliver non-physical
results. Even if one considered it perfectly appropriate for a
government to seek its members’ uniformity of religious belief,
on the Lockean view, the attempt to achieve it by coercive means
would be futile. 23 Physical force simply cannot accomplish what
religious dictators would like it to. 24
Locke contends, “It is only Light and Evidence that can work
a change in Mens [sic] Opinions; which Light can in no manner
proceed from corporal Sufferings, or any other outward
Penalties.” 25 It is in “the nature of the Understanding, that it
cannot be compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward force.
Confiscation of Estate, Imprisonment, Torments, nothing of that
nature can have any such Efficacy as to make Men change the
inward Judgment that they have framed of things.” 26
Consequently, a state-imposed belief would not truly be a belief
for it would not be authentic. 27 As Locke observes in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, “[W]e may as rationally
hope to see with other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s
understandings . . . . The floating of other men’s opinions in our
brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, [even if] they
happen to be true.” 28
For a belief to be genuine, in other words, it must be “selfauthored” in a crucial respect: the believer must affirm it because
his mind regards certain evidence and inferences as
demonstrating its truth. 29 He might be mistaken about whether
that reasoning does, in fact, logically warrant his conclusion. The
point here, though, is that in order for his belief to constitute a
genuine belief (as opposed to the pretense of a belief), he must
embrace it for reasons that make sense to him. He must endorse
23. See id.
24. I will use “repressors,” “censors,” and “dictators” interchangeably to refer to all
types of intellectual suppression by government, whether it specifically targets religion, the
press, or wider forms of expression and intellectual activity. I use “coercion” to refer to
pressure imposed by physical force, whether actual or threatened.
25. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 27 (James H. Tully ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689) [hereinafter LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION].
26. Id.
27. For our purposes, I am using “state” and “government” interchangeably.
28. 1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 115
(Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Dover Publ’ns 1959) (1689).
29. TARA SMITH, AYN RAND’S NORMATIVE ETHICS: THE VIRTUOUS EGOIST 117,
133-34 (2006) [hereinafter SMITH, THE VIRTUOUS EGOIST].
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the conclusion “by his own lights,” by his own independent
logical reckoning. The idea must stand on its merits, as far as he
can tell, rather than on the say-so of someone else. 30
Locke also pointed out that the pretense of a religious belief
would hardly fool a knowing god.
Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound,
and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be
not thoroughly perswaded thereof in my own mind, there
will be no safety for me in following it. No way whatsoever
that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my Conscience,
will ever bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed. 31

Insincere professions of faith might keep a man out of trouble
with Caesar, but they will not do him much good with the Lord.
Thus anyone concerned with the actual condition of man’s soul
should oppose attempts at its political manipulation.
While Locke’s point is fairly straightforward, a different
angle might deepen our grasp of its logic. A government’s
attempt to impose religious uniformity seeks to pressure a person
into religious conviction—believe this, do that, or else. . . (or else
some substantial penalty will be imposed). Yet conviction is not
susceptible to the types of pressures that a government can exert.
Why not? Because a person cannot acquire a conviction at will,
by the sheer exertion of choice. 32 A person can acquire many
things in that way, of course. He can get the glass on the top shelf
by deciding to reach up and grab it; he can obtain a cup of coffee
by placing his order and paying the cost; he can view the video
“on demand” by clicking the appropriate tab on his tablet.
Likewise, he can satisfy another person’s demands by deciding
that the pressures exerted against him are greater than he chooses
to bear: That knife is now too frightening, so I’ll surrender my
wallet; the interrogator’s threats of harm to my family are too
great for me to risk, so I’ll divulge the information he wants.
However effective threats of force might be for advancing certain
30. This is not to deny the wisdom of consulting with those who are more
knowledgeable about certain subjects. What is important is to maintain independence
concerning who are credible experts and the degree of confidence to be placed in their
counsel. See id.
31. LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 38. Coerced worship would
be “Hypocrisie, and Contempt of his Divine Majesty.” Id. at 26-27.
32. As philosopher Michael Lynch observes, “One does not simply will oneself to
believe. Rather, we pursue truth indirectly, by pursuing evidence that supplies us with
reasons for belief.” MICHAEL P. LYNCH, IN PRAISE OF REASON 125 (2012).
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purposes, the problem is that a man cannot engage in the
comparable calculation: “the threatened penalty is more than I
wish to bear; therefore, I believe in Jesus Christ.” Belief does not
work that way. Because the kinds of factors needed to change a
man’s beliefs “can in no manner proceed from corporal
Sufferings,” 33 as Locke puts it, it is pointless to try to induce
beliefs by such means. Force might entice a person to say that he
believes a particular doctrine, but it cannot make him believe it.
For outward conformity is merely that: the observable imitation
of some of the manifestations that typically accompany a
particular belief. It is not the real thing.
Essentially, Locke argues by appeal to the basic difference
in kind between reason and coercion. As he observes, “[I]t is one
thing to perswade, another to command; one thing to press with
Arguments, another with Penalties.” 34 The heart of Locke’s
argument is that an unbridgeable gap prevents coercive means
from advancing religious ends. Because belief results only from
“Light and Evidence,” religious belief is impervious to coercive
manipulation. 35
Locke was not alone in detecting this obstacle to achieving
religious belief through physical means. In 1644, John Milton
argued that “if [a man] believe[s] things only because his pastor
says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other
reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds
becomes his heresy.” 36 Anticipating Locke, Milton held that
“[w]hat matters is not outward conformity, but adherence to the
inner light.” 37 The man who asserts faith without understanding
surrenders the “locks and keys” to his soul. 38 Indeed, if a man
professes a religious belief in order to comply with rulers’
coercive commands, what he believes in is actually the power of
those men whom he obeys, rather than the divine object of their
belief. 39

33. LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 27.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION 37 (George H. Sabine ed.,
Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1951) (1644).
37. Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1851 (2009) (characterizing Milton’s view).
38. MILTON, supra note 36, at 38.
39. Id.
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Other thinkers employed similar reasoning. Thomas Hobbes
distinguished what the tools of the state could and could not
accomplish: “It is true, that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige
me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I beleeve
him not . . . .” 40 What the sovereign cannot do, however, is have
me “think any otherwise then my reason perswades me.” 41
Samuel Pufendorf maintained that “[i]t was not God Almighty’s
pleasure to pull People head-long into Heaven, or to make use of
the new French way of Converting them by Dragoons.” 42 Since
“truth could only be imparted by convincing arguments,” God left
the choice of salvation in a man’s own hands. 43 To exercise that
choice, a man must be free. 44 The contemporary scholar Susan
Jacoby notes that, historically, attempts to coercively impose
religion have merely produced a false uniformity that tended to
collapse once a breath of freedom was permitted. 45 Such a result
is exactly what Lockean thinking would predict. 46
This line of reasoning resonated for many of the American
colonists and Founding Fathers. A prominent vein of their
support for religious freedom was the concern that state
involvement with religion would corrupt religion by the very
means that Locke, et. al., had been calling attention to, namely,
by corrupting beliefs’ authenticity and thus intruding on a man’s
40. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 287 (W. G. Pogson Smith ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1958) (1651).
41. Id.
42. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE NATURE AND QUALIFICATION OF RELIGION IN
REFERENCE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 33 (Simone Zurbuchen ed., Jodocus Crull trans., Liberty
Fund, Inc. 2002) (1687).
43. Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1861.
44. See PUFENDORF, supra note 42, at 77-78; Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1860-61.
45. SUSAN JACOBY, STRANGE GODS: A SECULAR HISTORY OF CONVERSION 413-14
(2016). Jacoby also suggests that attempts at forced conversion reveal a lack of confidence
in the relevant religion’s persuasive power. Id. at 414. One would only resort to force if he
believed that voluntary means could not lead to the assent of the forcibly manipulated. Id.
46. The gradual “intellectualization” of religion over the centuries—the evolution of
certain sects away from emphasis on piety and ritual toward a person’s intellectual assent to
certain doctrines, alongside the shift from belief in select individuals as “chosen” and more
toward the notion that an individual’s own choosing determines his relationship to god—
may have motivated greater attention to the mechanics of the mind’s operations. That is, if
a person’s own choices and beliefs are critical to the state of his soul, it becomes important
to understand the conditions under which the salient choices and beliefs are truly possible.
Further, the more that a man’s spiritual well-being was seen as his own responsibility rather
than a matter of fate, the more reason he had to maintain the conditions that would allow him
to fulfill that responsibility. For an instructive discussion, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 29, 136-138 (2013).
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relationship with God. 47 The Baptist minister Isaac Backus, for
instance, argued that only a voluntary obedience could constitute
true devotion. 48 “As God is the only worthy object of all religious
worship, and nothing can be true religion but a voluntary
obedience unto his revealed will, of which each rational soul has
an equal right to judge for itself, every person has an unalienable
right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion
of his own mind, where others are not injured thereby.” 49 Roger
Williams, a renowned champion of religious freedom, insisted
that authenticity was indispensable to salvation and that it could
not be secured by force. 50
A carnal weapon or sword of steel may produce a carnal
repentance, a show, an outside . . . uniformity through a state
or kingdom . . . [Yet], an unbelieving soul, being dead in
sin . . . cannot please God; and, consequently, whatever such
an unbelieving and unregenerate person acts in worship or
religion, it is but sin. 51

A man might be induced to go through the motions of belief,
Williams recognized, yet all that “the sword may make” is a
“nation of hypocrites.” 52 “[T]he straining of men’s consciences
by civil power is so far from making men faithful to God or man
that it is the ready way to render a man false to both.” 53 Williams
condemned any constraint of religious liberty as “soul rape,” his

47. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a
Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510, 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) [hereinafter
Jefferson, Danbury Baptist Association]; James Madison, To the Honorable the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia: A Memorial and Remonstrance (June 20, 1785),
in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973)
[hereinafter Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance]; Isaac Backus, Draft for a Bill of
Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution (1779), in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE
AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789 app. 3 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968).
48. Backus, supra note 47.
49. Id.
50. See Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1855-56.
51. ROGER WILLIAMS, The Bloudy Tenent, in ROGER WILLIAMS, JOHN COTTON AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A CONTROVERSY IN NEW AND OLD ENGLAND 87, 88 (Irwin H.
Polishook ed., 1967) (1644) (This work was originally published in the same year as Milton’s
Areopagitica).
52. Id. at 92.
53. ROGER WILLIAMS, The Bloody Tenet Yet More Bloody, in ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 167, 195 (James Calvin
Davis ed., 2008) (1652).
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strong language being a reflection of his reverence for the sanctity
of authentic conviction. 54
Concerned as some were to separate church and state in
order to protect the purity of a man’s religious life, it is significant
that many Founders who were not themselves committed to any
particular religion (such as the Deists James Madison, Thomas
Jefferson, and Thomas Paine) nonetheless staunchly defended
religious freedom. 55 For they saw its value as rooted in something
deeper than the value of religion (an issue we will explore further
in Part IV). 56 Two of the First Amendment’s greatest champions
employed Lockean, mind-based reasoning on its behalf. 57
Like Williams, Jefferson reasoned that “attempts to
influence [the mind] by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by
civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness.” 58 Rulers’ attempts to assume “dominion over the
faith of others” merely establish false religions. 59 Madison
likewise argued:
“that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason
and conviction, not by force or violence.” The Religion then
54. ROGER WILLIAMS, The Bloudy Tenet of Persecution, For Cause of Conscience,
Discussed in a Conference Between Truth and Peace, in ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 108, 142-43 (Perry Miller ed., 1965) (1644).
Koppelman’s discussion of Williams and others (including Baptist minister John Leland,
Congregationalist minister Elisha Williams, and Thomas Paine) is instructive. See
Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1854, 1862-63, 1869-71.
55. Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1863, 1866, 1870, 1874.
56. This accords with the (relatively) conceptual theory of language that the Founders
employed. As Evan Bernick discusses, the Founders were influenced by Locke’s portrait of
words as referring to kinds, rather than to narrow particulars. See Evan Bernick, Reason’s
Republic, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 2016 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17-18) (on file at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798715)
[https://perma.cc/969VU2M2].
57. While Jefferson is not as directly associated with specific constitutional provisions
as are Madison and certain others, I call him one of the First Amendment’s champions based
on Jefferson’s express commitment to the Constitution’s guiding principles as well as to
freedom of thought, in particular, as evidenced in such writings as the Declaration of
Independence and Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); VA. CONST. art. I, § 16. Moreover, Jefferson coined
the metaphor of a wall between church and state. Jefferson, Danbury Baptist Association,
supra note 47.
58. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 346, 346 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
59. Id. Jefferson also observed that the effect of religious coercion has been “to make
one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 160 (William Peden ed., 1954) (1785).
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of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience
of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it
as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable
right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men,
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own
minds cannot follow the dictates of other men. 60

Historically for over fifteen centuries, Madison observed,
the effects of legal establishments of Christianity, far from
serving the “purity and efficacy of Religion,” have begat only
“pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the
laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.” 61
As instructive as I believe the Lockean reasoning for
religious freedom is, its limitations are significant. First, it is a
narrow defense of religious freedom. It argues against one
particular rationale for government restriction of religion (albeit,
a prominent one in its era), namely, the view that government
coercion could “fix” a person’s convictions. 62 Accordingly, at
most, the Lockean argument would defeat that rationale for
religious repression, but could not underwrite any wider
foundation for religious freedom. The more credence one thought
that other defenses of repression might hold, therefore, the less
potent the Lockeans’ overall contribution.
More troublesome, Locke’s own understanding of
“toleration” was severely limited. He did not believe that
religious freedom extended to Roman Catholics or to atheists, for
instance. 63 His reasoning was that Catholics and atheists both
posed a threat to civil order; they could not be trusted to not
interfere with the proper operations of government. 64 In Locke’s
60. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 47, at 298, 299. The internal
quotation is from George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights, which had been adopted
in June 1776. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
61. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 47, at 301.
62. Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1858-59.
63. Id. at 1859. Not all in the Lockean tradition necessarily agreed with him, yet his
views were hardly unusual in his era. Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore discuss the
Test and Corporation Actions of 1673, for example, which would have required all civil and
military office holders of the British crown to receive sacraments by the rites of the Anglican
Church. See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A
MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE 78-79 (2005).
64. Locke writes, “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God.
Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold
upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all.” LOCKE,
CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 51. In regard to Catholics’ devotion to Papal
authority, “No Opinions contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are
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defense, note that this is the right kind of reason for denying
rights—a person’s disruption of the government’s ability to fulfill
its function. That is, a government properly restricts, apprehends,
or punishes people exactly when they are endangering others’
rights or obstructing the government’s efficacy in protecting those
rights. Thus, if certain people are known to pose such dangers,
they would forfeit the usual legal rights. The problem, however,
is that evidence and logic do not vindicate Locke’s contention that
atheists and Catholics do pose such a threat. They are not known
(and were not, even in Locke’s era) to create such disruptions. 65
The upshot is this: The Lockean line of reasoning, by
directing attention to the nature and conditions of thought
formation, marks a major advance in our understanding of the
value of religious freedom. Nonetheless, this reasoning is
imperfect and incomplete. The critics we shall consider next,
however, have not focused their attacks on these relatively
peripheral shortcomings of the Lockean argument. Rather, they
challenge its central claim about the connection between thinking,
believing, and freedom.

III. THE CRITICS’ DISMISSAL: WHAT FORCE CAN
DO
Jeremy Waldron and Brian Leiter, among others, argue that
the Lockean portrait of the relationship between thought and force
is simplistic. 66 You can force a mind into embracing certain
necessary to the preservation of Civil Society, are to be tolerated by the Magistrate.” Id. at
49. “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the Magistrate, which is constituted
upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves
up to the Protection and Service of another Prince. For by this means the Magistrate would
give way to the settling of a foreign Jurisdiction in his own Country, and suffer his own
People to be listed, as it were, for Souldiers against his own Government.” Id. at 50.
65. See Jim Powell, John Locke: Natural Rights to Life, Liberty, and Property, FOUND.
FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 1, 1996), https://fee.org/articles/john-locke-natural-rights-to-lifeliberty-and-property/ [https://perma.cc/X5XL-E86W]; Adam Lee, If Peace on Earth is Our
Goal, Atheism Might be the Means to that End, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/06/peace-on-earth-atheism
[https://perma.cc/ZPY8-3633].
66. See LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-12; Waldron, supra note 17, at 67-68, 85.
Pevnick also criticizes this argument, although he contends that Locke has other resources
by which to defend religious toleration. See Pevnick, supra note 16, 847-48. Because my
focus is not on Locke per se but on the general line of reasoning he shares with others, I set
aside such further discussion of Locke. Whether or not Pevnick proves right in maintaining
that Locke can offer stronger arguments for toleration, my arguments about the merits of his
futility argument will be unaffected.
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ideas. Dictators successfully have, in numerous places: Red
China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Cuba. 67 According to Leiter,
history offers plentiful examples of societies in which the tyranny
of the few is accepted by the many as desirable, showing that
“states can successfully inculcate beliefs.” 68 Indeed, dictators
employ repression and propaganda precisely because they are
effective. 69 Millions of North Koreans believe the lies they are
fed about Kim Jong Un, just as masses believed the lies they were
fed about Mao or Stalin, or about Jews or other reputed state
enemies. 70
Like it or not, Locke’s critics claim, repression works.
Dictators censor, muzzle, and deny people access to vast streams
67. See Alex Newman, Communist Chinese Regime Forcing Rural Population Into
Cities, THE NEW AM. (June 19, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/worldnews/asia/item/15755-communist-chinese-regime-forcing-rural-population-into-cities/
[https://perma.cc/VR75-XBVU]; Thomas Skallerup, Historical Setting: 1917 to 1982, in
SOVIET UNION: A COUNTRY STUDY 56, 68-71 (Raymond E. Zickel ed., 2d ed. 1991);
Genocide in the 20th Century: Pol Pot in Cambodia 1975-1979, THE HIST. PLACE (1999),
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/pol-pot.htm [https://perma.cc/E5RMCJGP]; Lorenzo Canizares, Commentary: Cuba: What Went Wrong?, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ANTI-REVOLUTIONISM
ON-LINE
(1983),
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/pol-pot.htm [https://perma.cc/M32FNKM3].
68. LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11.
69. The term “propaganda” is commonly used in at least two different ways.
Sometimes, the term refers to information presented in a manner deliberately designed to
foster its positive reception, although no coercion is involved. A candidate’s political
campaign or a product’s advertising campaign, for example, present their messages in ways
crafted to elicit strong, favorable reactions. Other times, “propaganda” refers to information
that is managed by the government through such means as the silencing of critics, banning
particular publications, shutting down websites, or the dissemination of government-created
“information” to encourage people’s acceptance of certain ideas. See Kenneth A. Osgood,
Propaganda,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
AM.
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(2002),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/political-science-andgovernment/political-science-terms-and-concepts-62
[https://perma.cc/525H-XS8V].
Regimes that repress religious freedom employ propaganda in the latter sense.
70. See Ian Birrell, “How Could our Country Lie so Completely?”: Meet the North
Korean
Defectors,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
27,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/global/2016/aug/27/north-korea-defectors-ian-birrell
[https://perma.cc/4H5M-3K68]; Bao Tong, China: The Myth and the Lies of Mao Zedong
still Oppress China, ASIANEWS.IT (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Themyth-and-the-lies-of-Mao-Zedong-still-oppress-China-29929.html
[https://perma.cc/W9Z4-UWTP]; Arnold Beichman, Tyrant’s Death Recalled: Why did
Intelligent People Believe Stalin’s Lies?, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2003),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/858004/posts
[https://perma.cc/3TAH-SCQ3];
Jane McGrath, 10 of the Biggest Lies in History, HOW STUFF WORKS (2016),
http://history.howstuffworks.com/history-vs-myth/10-biggest-lies-in-history10.htm
[https://perma.cc/L3RG-RNTR].
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of information. The fact that dissidents persist and often produce
impressive work while censored or imprisoned demonstrates that
their minds are not incapacitated by the restrictions. (Consider
Fyodor Dostoyevsky under Tsars Nicholas I and Alexander II, for
instance, 71 or Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky in the
USSR, 72 or political dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and
Natan Scharansky. 73) Religious repressors often win wide
compliance with their demands. As Leiter sums it up, Locke
simply “fail[ed] to appreciate the full complexity of the
psychology and sociology of belief inculcation.” 74 The Lockean
argument, he contends, relies on a romanticized image of freedom
that is out of touch with reality. 75
Waldron offers a more extended and more penetrating probe
of the Lockean line, but its thrust is basically the same. “Censors,
inquisitors, and persecutors have usually known exactly what
they were doing,” Waldron maintains, and thereby, have been
able to manipulate their subjects’ beliefs. 76 While the physical
tools of coercion may not be able to reach every corner of a
person’s thinking process or directly install a belief in a person’s
mind in the same way that a surgeon can implant a chip in a skull,
these tools can steer belief toward a dictator’s desired
conclusions.
Consider the portion of an individual’s thinking that may
seem the least susceptible to external manipulation, his attention.
Surely, one might suppose, whatever external pressures are
applied against him, the individual can still direct or withhold his
mental faculties from attending to various objects and ideas. Yet
71. While Alexander was comparatively liberal and relaxed many of Nicholas’
repressive measures, his regime remained firmly autocratic and employed coercion to instill
specific religious beliefs. See ALEXANDER POLUNOV, RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY: AUTOCRACY, REFORM, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1814-1914, 35 (Thomas C. Owen
& Larissa G. Zakharova eds., 2005); NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, RUSSIAN IDENTITIES: A
HISTORICAL SURVEY 168, 172 (2005); W.E. Mosse, Alexander II, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA ONLINE (June 22, 2016) http://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander-IIemperor-of-Russia [https://perma.cc/T3C3-J8PX].
72. See Keith Gessen & Masha Gessen, What Became of the Soviet Dissidents?, INST.
FOR HUM. SCI. (2016), http://www.iwm.at/transit/transit-online/what-became-of-the-sovietdissidents/ [https://perma.cc/TG23-3Y6L].
73. See Natalie Clifford Barney, Natan Sharansky, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Dec.
20,
2014),
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Natan_Sharansky
[https://perma.cc/8XUM-SBAK].
74. LEITER, supra note 17, at 11.
75. See id.
76. Waldron, supra note 17, at 85.
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even this, Waldron argues, leaves ample berth for a government,
through the coercive manipulation of a person’s intellectual
environment, to determine what that person is likely to regard as
true. 77 By careful control over the material in a person’s
“information feed”—over what a person is exposed to as well as
what he is kept from, along with the prominence given to certain
ideas, the spin with which they are presented, the repetition of
themes, their reinforcement across different spheres (political,
artistic, athletic, social, occupational), and so on—coercion can
go a long way to inculcating specific notions. 78 Waldron claims
that any of a person’s particular beliefs results, in part, from a
surrounding “epistemic apparatus.” 79 The manipulation of this
apparatus by means of interference with a person’s intellectual
atmosphere will naturally affect the inferences that seem logical
to him. If, for example, a regime compels people to memorize a
catechism or to read a scripture daily or to participate in certain
religious rituals, this may well increase the number of people who
come to affirm the associated doctrines. 80 Certain outward
displays of conformity to a belief, even if they are coerced, can,
over time, encourage the adoption of that belief in earnest. While
a law requiring daily attendance at mass might not itself make you
a believer, in other words, it could incline you in that direction.
Waldron’s point is that indirectly, coercion can advance the
sought results. 81 Bear in mind, too, that even if a person comes
to believe something under false pretenses (because he was
systematically deprived of pertinent information, for instance), he
believes it. This, the critics claim, refutes the Lockean contention
that conviction cannot be coerced. 82 Much as we might wish it
otherwise, canny manipulation by coercive means can achieve
uniformity of belief. 83

77. See id. at 81.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 82. This is “the apparatus of selection, attention, concentration and so on –
which, although it does not generate belief directly, nevertheless plays a sufficient role in its
genesis to provide a point of leverage.” Id. at 82.
80. Waldron, supra note 17, at 83-84.
81. Id. at 81.
82. Id.
83. For critical discussion of Waldron’s reasoning on this, see Darryl Wright, Reason,
Force, and the Foundations of Politics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CAPITALISM: OBJECTIVISM
AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, AYN RAND SOCIETY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (Robert
Mayhew & Gregory Salmieri eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 44-54) (on file with author).
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IV. HOW THE CRITIQUE MISSES ITS MARK
A. Force Impedes the Acquisition of Knowledge
The critics’ charge holds a definite plausibility. For under
dictatorships that deny intellectual freedom, some constructive
thought, some knowledge, and correspondingly, some production
of material values do continue to take place. Production does not
grind to a halt. Yet the Lockean position does not entail that it
should; it does not deny the possibility of all such values. What
it challenges is a certain image of the relationship between these
values. In particular, it challenges the assumption that knowledge
and the creation of values can occur independently of the freedom
or restriction of individuals’ minds. 84
The Lockeans’ critics argue as if, because certain intellectual
and material goods can exist in a society that stifles intellectual
freedom, such freedom must be irrelevant. 85 This is a stunningly
superficial account of the situation, however. While the
combination of “freedom denied, goods supplied” might, at a
quick glance, appear to refute the Lockean argument, this accepts
the goods at face value without inquiring into their origins. A
simple question is critical: how do people acquire these goods?
By means of what activities and by virtue of what conditions?
Can intellectual or material goods (literature, science, airplanes,
smartphones, penicillin) be had under simply any conditions?
Are they impervious to the freedom of men’s environment?
Hardly. Witness the dramatically different standards of
living in free and intellectually constricted nations. 86 Witness the
dearth of discoveries, inventions, and innovation that emerge
from repressed societies.
How many new ideas—novel
84. By “values,” I mean those goods, material or spiritual, that objectively contribute
to human well-being. The concept thus encompasses such things as food, clothing, and
medicine as well as knowledge, art, friendship, and self-esteem. See AYN RAND, The
Objectivist Ethics, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF EGOISM 10, 16-19,
25-27 (1964) [hereinafter RAND, The Objectivist Ethics]; LEONARD PEIKOFF, OBJECTIVISM:
THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND 206-220, 241-249 (1991); TARA SMITH, VIABLE VALUES:
A STUDY OF LIFE AS THE ROOT AND REWARD OF MORALITY 83-85 (2000); SMITH, THE
VIRTUOUS EGOIST, supra note 29, at 19-32.
85. See Ruven Chu et al., Censorship & Freedom of Speech, STAN. COMPUTER SCI.,
https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs201/projects/communism-computingchina/censorship.html [https://perma.cc/A4JM-VS5M].
86.
See
United
States
vs.
North
Korea,
INDEX
MUNDI,
http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/united-states.north-korea
[https://perma.cc/QN4C-NDVX].
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techniques, innovative processes, and useful products based on
these—are spawned by the inhabitants of obedience regimes?
How many scientific discoveries have been achieved under the
intellectual dictatorships of North Korea or Afghani theocrats? 87
How many patents were held by the residents of Pol Pot’s
Cambodia? 88 When entire areas of inquiry are legally forbidden,
individuals’ minds are prevented from engaging with information
that might be true and with ideas that might spark creative
connections and the development of new knowledge. 89
Intellectually repressive regimes tend to lag in material wellbeing by all the conventional measures of health, life expectancy,
GNP, purchasing power, product quality, standard of living. 90
Numerous economic studies make plain the material fruits of
freedom. 91 While these studies primarily measure the effects of
economic freedom, rare is the regime that restricts economic
freedom while respecting intellectual freedom. Indeed, doing so
would be counter-productive from the standpoint of the
repressors. For effective restriction of one requires restriction of
the other. As Rand’s work emphasizes, for human beings, the
87. See International Science Ranking, SCIMAGO J. & COUNTRY RANK,
http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php [https://perma.cc/BM4J-7HB4].
88. See Dezan Shira, Cambodia Recognizes First Patent Application, ASEAN
BRIEFING (Mar. 12, 2015) http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/03/12/cambodiarecognizes-first-patent-application.html [https://perma.cc/2XT6-YQBN].
89. See Innovation in the Arab World: From Zero to Not Much More, THE
ECONOMIST, June 4, 2016, at 42.
90. See Matthew Nitch Smith, The 17 Countries with the Worst Quality of Life in the
World, BUS. INSIDER (July 1, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/social-progress-indexcountries-with-the-worst-quality-of-life-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/R2JF-BUKG].
91. See Economic Freedom Report, FRASER INST., http://www.freetheworld.com/
[https://perma.cc/2UEN-FB9Z]; Economic Freedom Report: The Relationship Between
Economic
Freedom
and
Economic
Well-Being,
FRASER
INST.,
http://www.freetheworld.com/efna/3EFNAch3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9SZ-FT2X]
(summary essay on the link between economic freedom and economic well-being); 2016
Index of Economic Freedom, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/index/
[https://perma.cc/6RCK-2X9K]; Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, CATO INST.,
http://www.cato.org/centers/center-global-liberty-prosperity
[https://perma.cc/Z2CYUUQ3]; Dan Mitchell, The Amazing Hockey Stick of Economic Progress, INT’L LIBERTY
(June 27, 2014), https://danieljmitchell.wordpress.com/2014/06/27/the-amazing-hockeystick-of-economic-progress/ [https://perma.cc/Y89N-E32Y] (famous “hockey stick graph”
of material growth resulting from greater freedom); Marginal Revolution Univ., The Hockey
Stick of Human Prosperity, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9FSnvtcEbg
[https://perma.cc/7ELU-76R9]; Angus Maddison, The Contours of World Development, THE
WORLD ECON. (May 17, 2010), https://sites.google.com/site/econgeodata/maddison-dataon-population-gdp [https://perma.cc/9XFY-3VLV] (original underlying research of
economist Angus Maddison).
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creation of any goods requires a process of thinking: identifying
the relevant needs, adopting specific aims so as to meet them, and
devising suitable means of achieving those aims. 92 “[E]verything
man needs has to be discovered by his mind and produced by his
effort,” she writes. 93 “Production is the application of reason to
the problem of survival.” 94
Don Watkins and Yaron Brook describe the “production of
wealth [as] fundamentally an intellectual project.” 95 Wealth
creation must be, in its inception, knowledge creation. 96 As the
economist Deirdre McCloskey puts it, “Our riches were not made
by piling brick upon brick . . . but by piling idea upon idea.” 97
Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has long been demonstrating that
material well-being does not depend on economic freedom
alone. 98 Sen considers what he calls political freedoms as “among
the constituent components” of economic development. 99
Freedom of thought is part and parcel of the ability to devise new
products, new techniques, and new means of trade.
Consequently, for dictators to restrict people’s intellectual
activities while leaving free their economic activities, in hopes of
material prosperity, would be a doomed enterprise. The
starvation of the mind necessarily constricts the products of the
mind. By the same token, for dictators to restrict people’s
92. See AYN RAND, What is Capitalism?, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 11,
16-17 (1967) [hereinafter RAND, What is Capitalism?]; RAND, The Objectivist Ethics, supra
note 84, at 22-24. Rand illustrates this theme dramatically across her novel ATLAS
SHRUGGED (1957). See generally AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957) (describing the
necessity of freedom for man to pursue his highest potential and the society that best enables
him to do so).
93. See RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17.
94. Id.
95. DON WATKINS & YARON BROOK, EQUAL IS UNFAIR: AMERICA’S MISGUIDED
FIGHT AGAINST INCOME INEQUALITY 90, 102-103 (2016).
96. Id.
97. Deirdre McCloskey, How Piketty Misses the Point, CATO POL’Y REP. (July/Aug.
2015),
https://www.cato.org/policy-report/julyaugust-2015/how-piketty-misses-point
[https://perma.cc/BY93-DJNP]. For extensive elaboration, see generally Deirdre Nansen
McCloskey, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the
World, in 3 THE BOURGEOIS ERA (2016) (arguing that people across the world are richer
than at any point in human history because of ideas and economic competition).
98. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 5 (1999).
99. Id. Sen counts as political freedoms “liberty of political participation and dissent,”
“free speech and elections,” “democratic arrangements” such as “a multiparty democracy
with elections and free media,” and freedom of “public discussion and participatory political
decisions.” Id. at 5, 11, 51-52, 123. For his definitions of specific types of freedom, see id.
at 38-40.
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economic activities while leaving free their intellectual activities
would court rebellion, since intellectually free people will be
likely to realize how much better their material conditions could
be.
The point is, the kind of “repeat after me” society created by
intellectual repression is not conducive to breakthroughs that
advance knowledge or to innovations that improve people’s lives.
Obviously, intellectual repression does not cause the immediate
annihilation of all life-enhancing values. People can still get by
when their range of thought is restricted. The problem is that they
cannot prosper. 100 They can produce only to the extent that they
rely on the knowledge that freer minds had previously acquired;
they are reduced to the position of parasites. 101 While those who
are restricted may be able to coast on the knowledge of others for
a while, the straitjacketing of their minds means that they will not
be able to generate any further knowledge. “Intellectual goalong” can take these people only as far as the minds of the rulers
who set the boundaries concerning which ideas will and will not
be permitted. 102
It is also significant that even people’s understanding of
things that had previously been discovered will atrophy if they are
not permitted robust and skeptical engagement with that
knowledge. A person must grasp the basis for a claim, at least in
rudimentary terms, in order for it to have the status of knowledge
in his mind. As simple a claim as that water is H2O is meaningless
in the mind of a person who has no comprehension of chemical
elements. Indeed, it is people’s re-thinking of accepted ways and
beliefs that frequently prompts better ideas—corrections,

100. For Rand’s remarks on this, see AYN RAND, AYN RAND ANSWERS: THE BEST
HER Q&A 32-34 (Robert Mayhew ed., 2005) [hereinafter RAND, THE BEST OF HER
Q&A]. Bear in mind that these were made in spontaneous response to oral questions.
101. People who do not think “can survive only by imitating and repeating a routine
of work discovered by others—but those others had to discover it, or none would have
survived.” RAND, What is Capitalism, supra note 92, at 17. While the context of this
statement was people who willfully refuse to think, the point applies equally to those who
are forcibly prevented from thinking. Non-thinkers’ survival is made possible by those who
are free to discover the knowledge that the satisfaction of their needs requires. See RAND,
The Objectivist Ethics, supra note 84, at 19-20.
102. Wright discusses the comparable impairment of literary work, particularly
drawing on the reflections of Polish author Czeslaw Milosz. Wright, supra note 83, at 63.
Censored writers may continue to generate output, but “[w]hat is impeded is the ability to
write fluidly, authentically and insightfully.” Id. at 64.
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refinements, extensions, fresh applications.
This is how
knowledge advances. More on this, later.
Let us return from this probing of intellectual freedom more
directly to the dispute between Lockeans and their detractors.
The thrust of the critics’ charge is that repression works.103
Contrary to Lockean assertions of coercive instruments’
impotence to alter people’s beliefs, Leiter and Waldron maintain
that dictators successfully use such means to accomplish exactly
what they want. 104 It is crucial to ask, however, repression
“works” to accomplish what, precisely? Coercion certainly can
deliver the obedience that a dictator wants. If some dictators do
not care what the masses believe but simply want certain conduct,
force can achieve that. It cannot alter belief, however, according
to the Lockeans, and this is what they find problematic. 105 While
they recognize that physical force can compel physical
compliance, outward conformity with a dictators’ demands does
not necessarily signify genuine conviction. You cannot “get
religion” via cattle-prod. In this, I think, the Lockeans are leading
us to a significant truth. They do not grasp it fully, however, as
we shall see.
Undeniably, as Leiter and Waldron point out, through the
systematic dissemination of propaganda and tight control over the
thoughts and theories that people are permitted to be aware of,
repressors can lead people to accept false conclusions. 106
Forcible restrictions can limit the materials that are available for
a person to consider as well as the incentives that he has to
entertain various lines of thought (incentives posed by the
punishments attached to deviation from the state-approved
orthodoxy). Such manipulation of the intellectual environment
will naturally influence the conclusions that people draw, even if
they are scrupulously rational with the material they are fed. Yet
none of this touches the heart of the Lockean claim, which
concerns the nature of rational thought.
What the critics regard as the censors’ “success” rests in the
fact that some of their victims do end up believing the censors’
desired conclusions as a result of the regime’s deliberate

103.
104.
105.
106.

LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11.
Id.; Waldron, supra note 17, at 81.
See LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11.
Id.
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distortions. 107 Even this is not precisely what the Lockeans
dispute, however. The problem, as the Lockeans see it, is that
these people will embrace false ideas. 108 One does not need to
agree about the truth of a particular religious doctrine to
appreciate that they are on to an important epistemological fact.
This is where Rand takes their insight further. By examining
more closely the necessary conditions of rational thought and
knowledge, she deepens and fortifies the Lockean line.
Rand explains that “[a] rational mind does not work under
compulsion.” 109 A human mind cannot function cognitively—in
a way that enables it to understand a phenomenon, to know
reality—while it is bound by the standing order to affirm what the
dictators decree. By demanding that a person act against his own
judgment, “[f]orce invalidates and paralyzes” his capacity for
judgment; it renders it moot. 110 Yet while a person’s mind “may
be hampered by others, . . . silenced, proscribed, imprisoned,”
Rand observes, “it cannot be forced; a gun is not an argument.” 111
To be still more precise, a mind cannot be forced to
understand a particular argument or to know a particular
conclusion. It cannot be forced to do the kinds of things that a
human mind uniquely can.
Those who manipulate an intellectual environment can
foster people’s assent to the manipulators’ specific goals. That is
not the same as fostering rational inquiry, however. And rational
inquiry is the only path to genuine knowledge (concerning god or
any subject). The laws of a censor cannot compel a person’s
inferences to be logical or his conclusions to be valid. They
cannot force a person to think in the way that generates
knowledge, that brings awareness of reality. Therein rests its
ultimate bankruptcy. 112
107. See LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11.
108. See LORD KING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN LOCKE 364 (1884) (discussing
what the Lockeans regard as false, that is, given their own beliefs about religious truth). Not
all those who I have dubbed “Lockeans” shared the same faith, but they did each hold definite
views concerning what constitutes religious truth.
109. RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17, 23.
110. Id. at 2; see also PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 313.
111. RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17.
112. Recent testimony of this comes from a victim of such intellectual repression. See
generally Fang Lizhi, The Most Wanted Man in China: My Journey from Scientist to Enemy
of the State (Perry Link trans., 2016) (Fang Lizhi describing the intellectual repression he
faced as a scientist in China). His book’s theme is the “fundamental incompatibility between
science and the kind of faith in their own infallibility demanded by China’s leaders.” Richard
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John Stuart Mill offered a famous defense of intellectual
freedom that touches on some kindred claims. 113 While Mill’s
aim was to defend the political freedom of thought, his
observations also address the basic conditions that are necessary
for knowledge. 114
Even true ideas will deteriorate, Mill reasoned, in the minds
of people who are not accustomed to challenging them. 115 If a
person does not understand the grounds of an idea, that which
makes it true, it will sit as a mere prejudice or superstition in his
mind. Moreover, “[h]e who knows only his own side of the case,
knows little of that,” Mill observes. 116 A person can only
rationally assess the merits of competing views when he grapples
with opposing positions and understands the arguments beneath
them. 117 The upshot is, the acquisition of knowledge depends on
unrestricted access to ideas and unrestricted engagement with
them. This is exactly what intellectual repression expunges.

1. The Process, Not the Conclusion
While recognizing the limited things that force can
accomplish, the Lockeans’ focus on what force cannot deliver
helps us to recognize how destructive it is. To understand the
correlative value of intellectual freedom more fully, we need to
investigate the mechanics of human thought more closely. What
follows is an attempt to elaborate Rand’s account at a more finegrained level. 118 From the outset, bear in mind that thinking is
not an end in itself, but serves a definite purpose—namely, the
acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge, in turn, is valuable in
order to inform action—to guide human beings to the kinds of
actions that can advance our well-being. The process by which a
Bernstein, ‘The Most Wanted Man in China’ and ‘The Cowshed’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/books/review/the-most-wanted-man-in-chinaand-the-cowshed.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q76V-RXDK].
113. See JOHN STUART MILL, On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in ON
LIBERTY 86-95 (David Browmwich & Gorge Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
114. See id. at 86. While Mill and Rand are sometimes classified together as
“libertarians,” my invoking Mill here should not be taken to suggest any deep affinities
between his and Rand’s political thought. Rand had several serious differences with Mill
concerning utilitarianism and individual rights, among other things.
115. Id. at 102.
116. Id. at 104.
117. Id. at 104-05.
118. Peikoff and Wright provide good analysis of the impact of physical force. See
PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 310-23; Wright, supra note 83, at 1-2.
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person forms conclusions determines whether or not he is able to
do that.
In assessing any defense of religious freedom, therefore, it
would be a mistake to focus on the value of religion or on the
value of one particular religion versus another (such as
Anglicanism versus Catholicism). Rather, we should consider
how a person comes to his religious belief. What are the sorts of
things that a person does as a means of reaching a religious
conviction? While the exact steps vary in different cases,
typically, he will engage in some assortment of the following: he
thinks; he prays; he observes others; he emulates others in certain
respects; he talks to others about their religious beliefs; he reads
the doctrines and arguments of a particular religion or he reads
about a religion—some of its history, its detractors’ criticisms.
However extended or abbreviated a given person’s process,
however deep or shallow, systematic or casual, ultimately, he
makes up his mind. He decides whether to learn more about other
people’s beliefs or whether to “try out” alternative religions. He
decides whether he will continue to participate in the rituals that
he practiced as a child or whether to suspend all religious belief
or all interest in finding answers to the kinds of questions that
religion characteristically addresses (questions about mortality,
meaning, value, etc.). The point is, a person thinks in order to
embrace whatever religious views he does have. Even if a
particular person’s thinking is minimal or relatively uninquisitive, it is he who chooses to follow a given path. What is
significant for us is that religion represents a conclusion. A
person must be free in order to be able to investigate the relevant
evidence and draw that conclusion rationally.
Ultimately, a person must be free in order to reach valid
conclusions—the rational, reality-hugging conclusions that
enable him to understand the world around him, to act on that
basis, and thereby advance his well-being. Such freedom
naturally brings with it the opportunity to think irrationally and to
make poor decisions. The immediate point, however, is that it is
not the sanctity of any particular conclusion that underwrites the
value of religious freedom. Rather, it is the process by which
human beings reach conclusions and can attain the understanding
of the world that their well-being depends on. Freedom of the
mind is indispensable to that process. This is the foundation of
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intellectual freedom’s value—and correlatively, of religious
freedom’s value.

2. How Force Obstructs Rational Thinking
Consider: What does thinking consist of? What is required
to reach a conclusion and what is required to reach it rationally—
in a way that can yield knowledge? Milton’s observation that
“reason is but choosing” captures a crucial part of the answer. 119
A process of thinking involves confronting a series of
choices. To think about whether some proposition is true, a
person must choose between ever-shifting arrays of alternatives
that his mind lobs up to him—including those as basic as what
thoughts to attend to. He must decide which thoughts, of the
many that might occur to him, to consider further and which to
set aside; which to consider the relevance of and, if he deems
some relevant, which to assign credence to. To do this, in turn,
he must determine how to assess the relevance and credence of
each idea.
Further, he must figure out what weight to assign to those
ideas that he does regard as true. What is their probative
significance? How strongly do they support a particular
conclusion? He must also consider the implications of various
possible answers for the issue at hand and for other beliefs about
other issues. If this conclusion about this presidential candidate
is valid, for instance, am I logically compelled to revise my
previous conclusions about his overall merit or about who to vote
for? Or about whether to vote at all, this year?
Let us take a fairly commonplace example by which to
examine thought more closely. Consider an eighteen year-old
confronting the following question: Should I attend this
university or one of the other two that has accepted me? What
are some of the sub-questions he would need to answer, to answer
that? A barrage of questions will need his attention.
How expensive would it be to attend that school? What is
the financial aid package? How much debt can I afford to take
on? How much wage-earning work can I handle while in school?
When would I be able to pay off the accumulated debt? What are
some realistic timetables? To what extent would the pay offered
by a job after graduation have to become a primary concern in
119. Milton, supra note 36, at 25.
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deciding whether to take a job? What are the odds that I could
land jobs that would deliver the needed pay-scale? How much
pressure would that much debt create? Is it worth it?
What are my job prospects, holding a degree from that
school? How much do I care about those? How much should I
care about those? Should that be the deciding factor—my
likelihood of securing a sufficiently remunerative job immediately
after graduating? What about a job that is rewarding in other
respects? Which other respects?
What is the school’s environment like, the quality of life that
I can expect? Is its strength in literature but its weakness in so
many other areas a problem if I decide to abandon literature and
change majors? Is the school’s large size a plus or a minus? Are
the benefits of its broad range of courses, people, and
extracurricular activities offset by the danger of feeling
overwhelmed or anonymous at such a large institution? What
about those frigid winters? What about its distance from an
airport, for when I need to go home? How much should those
things affect my decision?
Obviously, parallel questions will arise for the other schools.
Further, a person might wonder: Should I postpone starting
school and re-apply next year? Should I really go to a university
at all? Is this a better option for me than working in Uncle Joe’s
company? Or than joining the Marines, which has worked out so
well for my cousin?
The above is easily twenty-plus questions, generated without
venturing beyond the most obvious. One might object that I overcomplicate issues. After all, most of us engage in this kind of
thinking quite routinely and less laboriously. My point, though,
is that however attentive or deliberate a person might be, thinking
largely consists of addressing a cascade of intellectual
intersections, a sprawling network of questions demanding
answers, and answers spawning additional questions. The
number and complexity obviously depend on the primary issue.
“Pepper on your salad?” does not normally warrant extended
analysis. “Should I marry her?” normally does. What is
important for understanding the value of religious freedom (and
wider intellectual freedom) is the fact that these choices can only
be made rationally if the roads to logical answers are
unobstructed. If, instead, a person lives under a repressive regime
in which evidence is withheld, “truth” is dictated, and permitted
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conclusions are strictly controlled, his process of thinking is
short-circuited, stymied by No Go zones, regions of cognitive
activity declared Off Limits.
To return to the person choosing a school, suppose his
government denies people information about specific schools or
fields of study that it deems threatening. This means that his
thinking about his principal question and its numerous offshoots
must be diverted to thinking about the consequences of his
pursuing what he deems the logical course. That is, if he
continues to explore the principal question as his judgment sees
fit, he will be penalized. He must now consider the penalties
attached to his course—penalties that have nothing to do with the
nature of the alternatives (the schools, their programs, costs, etc.)
and everything to do with the rulers’ wishes. Absent the
government restrictions, he is able to assess the issue on its merits.
With them, he must assess it on the basis of the external penalties
he will suffer if he reaches conclusions that the authorities
disapprove of.
Simply put, force is a game-changer. The threat of coercion
changes the subject. It diverts a person from thinking about the
best answer to a substantive question by evidence and logic to
calculating, instead, what penalties would be imposed if I
conclude a or b or c? How likely am I to suffer those penalties?
How severe are they? Are they worth risking? This is a
completely different set of questions, the pursuit of which does
not advance him at all on finding the logical answer to his original
question (be it about schooling, religion, or anything else). The
investigation of those is sidetracked, at best, burdened by the
imposition of this new cascade of questions, the answers to which
tell him nothing about the merits of one school—or one religion—
versus another.
In short, laws that deny intellectual freedom pre-empt a
person’s ability to reach conclusions about an issue rationally—
by the relevant evidence and logic. For the threat to punish
deviant thoughts does not offer reasons why one conclusion is
more sound than another. It does not illuminate the actual
character of the alternatives. By attaching penalties to particular
lanes of thought, such laws simply impose arbitrary barriers
(arbitrary, insofar as they bear no relation to the logic of
alternative conclusions about the substantive question).
Consider two kinds of propositions:
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(1) If you do x, it will be bad for you because of the
nature of x (e.g., If you maintain that diet, you are likely
to suffer from heart disease).
(2) If you do x, it will be bad for you because we will
punish you (e.g., If you maintain that diet, we will fine
you).
Laws repressing religious freedom are of the second type. In the
minds of those subject to them, their commands will stand as
random roadblocks to reasoning about the issue. The restricted
person is given no evidence to consider and no arguments to
examine. For the purposes of rationally answering a substantive
question (What should my religious views be?), they are useless.
Indeed, Rand claims that they are worse than useless 120 because
such arbitrary imperatives impose barriers to cognition. 121 Since
the victim is given no reason to believe these state-ordained ideas
but only reason to obey the attendant orders, they will paralyze
his ability to proceed rationally. Proceeding rationally, as we
have seen, would require interrogating the truth of premises,
examining their logical implications, identifying the relationships
between one hypothesis and other hypotheses and conclusions,
and so on. When ideas are presented to a person not as entrants
in the enterprise of rational examination of an issue but as edicts
that stand on force, however, they will function in the mind as red
lights—Stops!— to the logical progression of thought. 122
To be clear, Rand’s claim is not that laws that deny
intellectual freedom render a person incapable of all rational
thought. 123 They render him incapable of proceeding rationally
within the sphere of compliance. That is, they make it impossible
for him to proceed in a way that at once complies with the
arbitrary demand and that follows the rational course that can lead
to knowledge on the relevant question. For he must continually
second-guess his mind’s rational inferences: But will this please

120. PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 316.
121. See RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17, 23; PEIKOFF, supra note
84, at 313.
122. Yet another way to frame the difference: “Do as he says” and “Be rational” issue
very different kinds of instructions. When a law commands you to “Do as we say” simply
because we say it and we will hurt you if you do not (rather than because that law is rationally
justified by the proper mission of government), that command is incompatible with the
direction to be rational.
123. See RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17.

2017] WHAT GOOD IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?

971

the authorities? Will this step satisfy them, or might it appear a
sign of my insubordination? Might it lead me to another
inference that would upset them? If so, should I really continue
along that line of thought? Appeasing those in power becomes
the paramount concern, since their disfavor could quash all of a
person’s plans. It is in this way that intellectual repression thwarts
the use of reason and obstructs the acquisition of knowledge. 124

B. No “Interviews With the Gods”: The First
Amendment and the Function of Government
Because many defenders of religious freedom invoke the
First Amendment as its foundation, it is important to understand
how the Amendment relates to the Lockean line of defense. Far
from its serving to privilege religion, the full context reveals that
the Amendment’s treatment of religion is perfectly consonant
with Lockean reasoning. The Founders established a deliberately
secular government. 125 They did so based on the same
appreciation of the importance of mind freedom (rather than
religion-specific freedom) that flows out of the Lockean insight.
Ultimately, this discussion should thus reinforce our appreciation
that the propriety of religious freedom does not rely upon any
special value of religion. 126
In the American legal system, freedom of religion stands on
the conviction that religious belief falls beyond the scope of a
government’s legitimate authority. The premise beneath the First
124. Other sources further explain the difference between engaging with a question
when free and when under coercive threat of penalties. See TARA SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS
AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 143-155 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS]; TARA
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN OBJECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 99-105 (2015) [hereinafter
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW]; PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 310-323. Wright offers an extended
breakdown of Rand’s view of the relationship between force and the human mind. Wright,
supra note 83, at 35-75; Darryl Wright, “A Human Society”: Rand’s Social Philosophy, in
A Companion to Ayn Rand 235-37 (Allan Gotthelf & Gregory Salmieri eds., 2016). Rand
frequently discussed intellectual freedom. See generally AYN RAND, PHILOSOPHY: WHO
NEEDS IT 211-230 (1982) (discussing various views of Supreme Court justices on
intellectual freedom). See id. at 197-209 (discussing the problems associated with even
minimal government censorship); AYN RAND, THE RETURN OF THE PRIMITIVE: THE ANTIINDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 176-78 (Peter Schwartz ed., 1999).
125. SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SECULARISM 5-6
(2004).
126. None of what follows is to suggest that the Founders adhered to a single, uniform
position on religious and intellectual freedom, nor that they had a fully developed
understanding of such freedom’s philosophical foundations. What I present was, however,
the overwhelmingly dominant view. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 16.
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Amendment is that a person’s ideas are of no concern to the
government. 127 Ideas as such—a person’s ideas about god or
religion or his ideas about politics, morals, medicine, science,
literature, leisure, the weather, whatever—are simply not
germane to a government’s responsibilities. Whether a given
individual thinks, what he thinks about, and the conclusions he
might reach alter not at all his status as a rights holder. This is the
sole concern of government: what are the individual’s rights, and
do a particular person’s actions interfere with the rights of others?
The reason that we should separate church and state, in other
words, is that a person’s religion makes no difference to the proper
functioning of government. The government has a specific,
circumscribed mission: the protection of individual rights. 128
People’s religious beliefs do not affect its ability to accomplish
that mission.129 Madison affirmed as much when he wrote:
A just Government instituted to secure & perpetuate
[liberty] needs [ecclesiastical establishments] not. Such a
Government will be best supported by protecting every
Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal
hand which protects his person and his property; by neither

127. See Ben Clements, Note, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A
Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 534 (1989).
128. See generally U.S. CONST. (the Constitution was created to “secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves . . .”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (outlining
our inalienable rights including “Liberty”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison).
See also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 47 (2004) (discussing the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause); RANDY
E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 167-68 (2016) (discussing the purpose of the
Constitution); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 12-13 (2014) (discussing
Jefferson’s and Madison’s views on the need to protect individual liberty); SCOTT DOUGLAS
GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 6 (1995) (discussing that, according to Jefferson, the
Constitution should be interpreted to protect natural rights); KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra
note 63, at 73 (discussing that Locke argued that the function of government is to protect
liberty). As Evan Bernick puts it, notwithstanding their other differences, “[the Framers]
shared the same fundamental understanding of the proper function of government. For the
Framers, as for Locke, government was a means of protecting the natural rights of the
individual ‘to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole
property.’” Bernick, supra note 56, at 21.
129. Function is central to the structure and operations of a proper legal system. See
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 124, at 257.
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invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect
to invade those of another. 130

Accordingly, Madison held, “‘the equal right of every citizen
to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of
conscience’ is held by the same tenure with all our other
rights.” 131 Note that the importance of religion (either actual or
perceived) gives it no greater weight among legal considerations.
Jefferson similarly held that a person’s religious views should
neither expand nor shrink his legal freedom. 132
All of this fits perfectly with the Lockean conception of force
and of government (not surprisingly, since Locke’s writings were
a primary influence on the Founders). 133 According to Locke,
“the business of Laws is not to provide for the Truth of Opinions,
but for the Safety and Security of the Commonwealth, and of
every particular mans [sic] Goods and Person.” 134 Men contract
to obey civil authority not to be told “what to believe or how to
pray but simply for it to keep the peace.” 135 While a person may
“employ as many Exhortations and Arguments as he pleases,
towards the promoting of another man’s Salvation,” on Locke’s
view, “Force and Compulsion are to be forborne.” 136 Every man
“has the supreme and absolute Authority of judging for himself.
And the Reason is, because no body else is concerned in it, nor
can receive any prejudice from his Conduct therein.” 137 As the
influential thinker Joseph Priestley asked, “How is any person
injured by my holding religious opinions which he disapproves
of?”138 The state should be involved only if I threaten my
130. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 47.
131. Id.
132. Jefferson, observing that “opinion[s] in matters of religion . . . shall in no wise
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.” Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute
for Religious Freedom, VA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.vahistorical.org/collections-andresources/virginia-history-explorer/thomas-jefferson [https://perma.cc/EZ53-ELM9].
133. It was not only Locke’s political thought that was influential. Locke’s arguments
dominated eighteenth century views on epistemology and language. “To the extent that
Americans engaged in epistemological thought about language, including constitutional
language, they began with the remarkable arguments in Locke’s Essay.” Philip Hamburger,
The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 306 (1989).
134. LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 46.
135. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 75 (characterizing the Lockean view).
136. LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 47.
137. Id.
138. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 82. Quote from Priestley, the British
chemist who discovered oxygen, emigrated to America, and was a close friend of Franklin
and Jefferson, exerting influence in the Founders’ intellectual circles. Id. at 80-81.
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neighbor’s “person, property or good name.” 139 As Jefferson
memorably put the thought, “The legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.
But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty
gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”140
In the same vein, Rand held that government should take no
“judicial cognizance whatever of [a man’s] ideology.” 141 As
Leonard Peikoff explains her view, “The goal of a proper
society . . . is not to compel truth or virtue (which would be a
contradiction in terms), but to make them possible” by preserving
individuals’ freedom. 142
The point is, the Lockean view that the function of
government is the protection of individual rights—a view that
was constitutionally enacted by the American Founders—is a
logical outgrowth of recognition of the impotence of physical
instruments to achieve intellectual ends. (Handcuffs, pistols, and
prisons cannot assist cognitive functioning.) What Rand brought
out more fully is the reason why the function of government is
limited to the protection of individual rights, namely, the fact that
man’s life requires freedom from force. 143 That is, man’s material
well-being depends on the exercise of reason—on his ability to
engage in rational, knowledge-generating thought. All those
needs-satisfying goods that we spoke of earlier—everything from
the most basic food and shelter to the most sophisticated medical,
transportation, or communications devices—can only be had by
means of logical inferences. The requisite rational thought, in
turn, requires the absence of physical force, as we detailed in the
previous section, IV. A. If a man is to be respected as entitled to
seek to enjoy his life, he must be free of others’ forceful
interference.
For the purpose of understanding the value of religious
freedom in relation to the First Amendment, it is significant that
139. Id.
140. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS PROJECT: NOTES ON THE STATE
OF
VIRGINIA
176
(1781),
http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/Thomas-Jefferson-Notes-On-The-State-Of-Virginia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WHQ5-WMDG].
141. AYN RAND, THE NEW LEFT: THE ANTI-INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 99 (1971).
142. PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 367. He adds that while “[a] proper government is
based on a definite philosophy, [it may] play no role in promoting that philosophy.” Id.
143. Ayn Rand, Man’s Rights, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 320, 322-28
(1967) [hereinafter Rand, Man’s Rights]; PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 310-23.
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the Amendment does not solely address religion. 144 Its concern
is intellectual freedom, more broadly. Each of its specified
subjects—religion, speech, assembly, petition, and press—
involves the exercise of thought. 145 As Onkar Ghate has
observed, the now-familiar idea of the separation of church and
state is actually a shorthand for the separation of state and
ideas. 146 The rationale for carving out this intellectual domain is,
in the words of Jefferson, that “the legislative powers of
government reach actions only, and not opinions.” 147 The fact
that Jefferson made this point in the course of discussing religious
freedom testifies to his conviction that even religious freedom is
simply one aspect of wider intellectual freedom. Moreover,
Jefferson held that whatever violates any aspect of the First
Amendment “throws down the sanctuary which covers the
others”—further evidence of his belief in the unity of the
Amendment’s concerns. 148 Indeed, it is on exactly this premise
that U.S. courts have often resolved disputes ostensibly over
freedom of religion by invoking the broader right of secular
conscience. 149
The Founders’ regard for human intellect is well-known.
Thomas Paine proclaimed, “The most formidable weapon against
errors of every kind is Reason.” 150 “My own mind is my own
church.” 151 Jefferson pledged “eternal hostility against every
form of tyranny over the mind of man.” 152 Madison urged that a
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
146. Onkar Ghate, A Wall of Separation Between Church and State: Understanding
This Principle’s Supporting Argument and Far-Reaching Implications, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CAPITALISM: OBJECTIVISM AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, AYN RAND SOCIETY
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (Gregory Salmieri & Robert Mayhew eds.) (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 19) (on file with author).
147. Thomas Jefferson, A Wall of Separation, in THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 124, 130 (Forrest Church ed., 2004).
148. DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 63 (2002).
149. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943); U.S. v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 180, 186 (1965); Welsh v. U.S., 380 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (concerning military
conscription). Warren Burger’s claim that freedom of association and freedom of expression
are “two peas from the same pod” is another latter-day reflection of this holistic
understanding of the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 244 (1976) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
150. THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON 3 (1794).
151. Id. at 6.
152. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush, September 23, 1800, U. OF
GRONINGEN,
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clause explicitly asserting the right to conscience be added to
Article I of the Constitution, prior to any discussion of
Amendments. 153 The proposal was not adopted, according to
some, only because it was considered a needless redundancy; the
wider right to intellectual freedom was well-understood. 154 The
point is, this respect for intellectual activity helps to explain the
First Amendment’s explicit protection of several of its forms. 155
If this much shows that the First Amendment was not
designed to reflect any special reverence for religion, 156 neither
was the Founders’ conception of the authority of government
wedded to theism. Rather, as John Adams explained, the United
States is a “government[] erected on the simple principles of
nature.” 157 Its architects never “had interviews with the gods or
were in any degree under the inspiration of Heaven.” 158 This is a
government “founded on the natural authority of the people alone,
without a pretense of miracle or mystery.” 159 Correspondingly,
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomasjefferson/jefl134.php [https://perma.cc/ZVY4-TQNM]. Jefferson also famously advised,
“Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question
with boldness even the existence of a god; because, if there be one, he must more approve of
the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Peter Carr
Paris, Aug. 10, 1787, U. OF GRONINGEN,
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomasjefferson/jefl61.php [https://perma.cc/SGK2-BZ6V].
153. BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
209 (2015).
154. Id. at 209-10. The proposed clause read, “The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed.” Id. at 209.
155. See generally Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment
Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002) (arguing that the Framers were basically unified in
their reasoning for separation of church and state on the grounds of liberty of conscience).
156. David Anderson has argued that in conceiving of the First Amendment, the
Founders did not begin with a general theory of intellectual freedom, but rather, forged
solutions to specific grievances as circumstances demanded (e.g., restrictions on the press).
See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 488 (1983);
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT, FREEDOM
OF SPEECH: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 65, 72-74
(Vikram David Amar ed., 2009). As a matter of history, this may be correct. If it is, however,
their having come gradually to an increasingly robust understanding of intellectual freedom
would not tell against the validity of the idea that intellectual freedom is a deeper and wider
principle than religious freedom and that that is the essence of what they sought to safeguard
in the First Amendment.
157. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 41.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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as Oliver Ellsworth 160 encapsulated the reigning view, “The
business of civil government is to protect the citizen in his
rights . . . civil government has no business to meddle with the
private opinions of the people . . . . Legislatures have no right to
set up an inquisition and examine into the private opinions of
men.” 161
The larger lesson for reconciling the First Amendment’s
reference to religious freedom with the Locke-Rand line that I
have defended is straightforward. The Founders’ commitment to
a secular government whose authority is limited by its specific
function and their conception of the First Amendment as
safeguarding intellectual freedom are entirely consonant with the
Lockean thesis that coercion cannot compel conviction and that
the exercise of reason requires freedom from force. Even in the
thinking of those who framed the First Amendment, the
fundamental justification of religious freedom was not radiated
by the value of religion. Rather, religious devotion was
recognized as merely one of myriad options that a person had for
exercising his freedom. 162 Inserting the word “religious” before
the term “liberty” neither widens the scope of an individual’s
rights nor shrinks the legal system’s responsibility to safeguard
others’ rights. “Religious liberty” designates one of the types of
uses that a person might make of his rights—no more and no
less. 163
The fact that a great number of people espouse religion and
that it has at times exerted great influence over the fate of nations
bestows on it no different value as the object of legal protection
160. TOM W. CAMPBELL, FOUR SCORE FORGOTTEN MEN: SKETCHES OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 95-99 (1950) (discussing that Ellsworth was a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, member of the first Congress, and briefly Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court).
161. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 42.
162. This reflected the prevailing conception of rights. “Both Federalists and AntiFederalists agreed that the rights of Americans were innumerable. In particular, they agreed
that they had countless natural rights . . . to eat, sleep, shave and do any number of other
things of which human beings were capable . . . . ” Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30 (1994).
163. It is crucial to understand that this concerns only the proper freedom of a person’s
actions rather than the larger, “all things considered” moral character of his action. It can be
perfectly logical to condemn a person’s action as wrong or immoral, while affirming his right
to take the action—that is, as something that the person should be free to do. (It might be
wrong to attend the Catholic mass, for example, or to drink alcohol or to watch pornographic
film, but a person should be free to engage in these activities; the two are distinct questions.)
See SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 186.
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than any of the less momentous ways that a person might exercise
his freedom. Without question, religion has exerted monumental
influence in countless people’s lives. Because of this, we tend to
assume that it has special weight. In certain respects, it does.
From the perspective of a proper legal system, however—whose
singular mission is the protection of individuals’ liberty—it does
not. For again, whether or not a person embraces a religion in
itself makes no difference to his status as a bearer of rights—
either to the rights that he possesses or to his obligations to the
rights of others. If a person is inspired by religion to act in ways
that threaten others’ rights, he is properly subject to government’s
forcible restriction. The justification of this is the person’s action,
however, not his beliefs, since only actions can impinge on
others’ rights.
What the Founders understood and what Rand would
especially emphasize is that the right to engage in a particular
action (be it intellectual or physical) does not depend on the value
of that action. 164 Rather, it stems from the fact that a person’s life
is his, morally, to lead as he likes. 165 As long as he does not
infringe on others’ rights, a man is entitled to do with it as he
pleases. 166 Religious laissez-faire is of a piece with economic
laissez-faire. 167 Consequently, one does not need to believe in the
164. Rand, Man’s Rights, supra note 143, at 321-22.
165. Id.
166. Rand writes, “Under a proper social system, a private individual is legally free to
take any action he pleases (so long as he does not violate the rights of others) . . . .” Ayn
Rand, The Nature of Government, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 329, 331-32
(1967). Rand outlines her basic conception of rights in “Man’s Rights.” Rand, Man’s Rights,
supra note 143, at 322.
167. Recall the interplay between economic and intellectual freedom discussed in
Section IV.A. The Eighteenth Century Anglo-American conception of material and
intellectual freedom united marketplace freedom, political freedom, and spiritual freedom.
See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra 63, at 70. Rand understood the intimate connection
between these types of freedom. See AYN RAND, FOR THE NEW INTELLECTUAL: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND 23 (1961) [hereinafter RAND, FOR THE NEW INTELLECTUAL]
(“Intellectual freedom cannot exist without political freedom; political freedom cannot exist
without economic freedom; a free mind and a free market are corollaries.”); PEIKOFF, supra
note 84, at 353 (“Freedom is indivisible” and “There can be no right to think apart from the
right to act.”); Id. at 313 (“Since man is an integrated being of mind and body, any attempt
to force his mind necessarily represents an attempt to rule his actions and, vice versa.”);
Onkar Ghate, “A Free Mind and a Free Market Are Corollaries”: Rand’s Philosophical
Perspective on Capitalism, in A COMPANION TO AYN RAND 222-242 (Allan Gotthelf &
Gregory Salmieri eds., 2016) explaining that regardless of whether a person wielding force
demands that you surrender your wallet or that you accept a certain religious view, the
fundamental demand for surrender of your judgment is the same. On the importance of
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value of religion to make sense of the First Amendment’s
protection of religious liberty. As both the historical and
philosophical context make clear, religious freedom is not about
religion.
The propriety of religious freedom stems,
fundamentally, from the value of intellectual freedom. The
Lockeans’ recognition of the futility of force to deliver certain
kinds of intellectual results, fortified by Rand’s more exact
recognition that force obstructs rational thought and the
acquisition of knowledge, is a major contribution to our
understanding of this value. Thus the First Amendment does not
present an alternative to the Lockean defense of religious
freedom. When its context and rationale are properly understood,
it is a logical manifestation of that defense

C. A Forced Mind Is Not a Valuable Mind: Rand’s
Development of the Lockean Line
Having covered a good deal of territory, let us take stock.
Where do things stand in the debate between Lockeans and their
critics, and how do Rand’s views fit in?
The critics contend that the Lockean argument fails to prove
the futility of force for determining people’s beliefs. 168 Through
coercive if indirect means (such as by limiting people’s exposure
to certain ideas or requiring their participation in certain
activities), a government allegedly can manipulate people into
forming desired conclusions. 169 For the purpose of inculcating
certain beliefs, the tools of state coercion are more potent than
Lockeans allow.
In this, the critics are correct, although the Lockeans do not
deny force’s power to incentivize overt behavior. What the firstwave Lockeans and their critics both fail to appreciate, however,
is that what is at stake is much more than people’s espousal of a
particular creed, such as Anglicanism. The problem is not that
religion cannot be served by force, as Locke laments. 170 The
problem, on Rand’s analysis, is that force prevents the exercise of
reason and the attainment of genuine knowledge about any
intellectual freedom, see Darryl Wright, “A Human Society”: Rand’s Social Philosophy, in
A COMPANION TO AYN RAND 217-37 (Allan Gotthelf & Gregory Salmieri eds., 2016).
168. Jennifer Biess, Locke’s Theory of Intolerance, 15 RES PUBLICA: J.
UNDERGRADUATE RES. 1, 93-94 (2010).
169. LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-12; Waldron, supra note 17, at 61-64.
170. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 47.
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subject—religion, biology, physics, metaphysics, psychology,
economics, human relationships—the gamut. 171 Knowledge can
only be had when a person’s thinking is, in its fundaments,
evidence-based rather than force-decreed; when it is logic-guided
rather than weapon-averting. Dodging bullets is not the path to
curing cancer.
Even as the Lockean argument marks a real advance, then, it
is at best transitional, pointing us to a previously underappreciated fact, yet still hamstrung by allegiance to particular
conclusions. 172 Locke’s own denial of religious freedom to
Catholics and atheists reflects this failure to understand fully the
basis for religious freedom (which would justify that freedom for
everyone, not only those of a certain faith). 173 Nonetheless, by
exploring the roots of religious freedom in the nature of thought—
in the process of thinking—Lockeans lead us to consider the
conditions necessary for all thinking, not only that concerning
religion.
I have argued that the content of what a person believes,
whether religious or not, is immaterial to his right to religious
freedom.
What the Lockeans glimpsed and what Rand
appreciates more fully is that without freedom, a person would
not be able to use his rational faculty as the rational faculty.174
He would not be able to apply reason to all facets of reality, to all
available information on a given subject and to all the thoughts
that might be relevant to it. When a person’s thinking is
constricted by coercive penalties he will suffer if he raises that
question or if he considers that evidence or if he presses that
objection, he is permitted only to contemplate a subset of reality,
the redacted version that the government approves. This will
hamper his ability to know things (to put it mildly).
Rand’s contention is that a forced mind is not a valuable
mind. 175 It is valuable neither to its owner nor to the people
171. LEONARD PEIKOFF, THE OMINOUS PARALLELS: THE END OF FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 336 (1982).
172. While some of the Lockeans were more wed to particular religious conclusions
than were others, as a group, they did not fully grasp the relationship between force and
rational thought.
173. Frederick C. Giffin, John Locke and Religious Toleration, 9 J. CHURCH & ST. 3,
379-80, 84 (1967).
174. RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 322.
175. RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 11, 17, 23; RAND, The Objectivist
Ethics, supra note 84, at 25-26; Rand, Man’s Rights, supra note 143, at 322.
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around him—not as a human mind. When the threat of force
obstructs a person’s exercise of reason, it destroys that person’s
prize feature—man’s “comparative advantage,” in the language
of economists. 176 Religious repressors may be correct that if you
treat a man like a dog, you can get him to act like a dog; physical
stings can train obedience. Yet, you will reap no greater value
than that: compliance with dictated orders. The intellectual
capacity of the forcers will limit the intellectual capacity of their
victims. Under intellectual repression, you will reap a society no
more creative, no more inventive, no more clever or resourceful
or innovative or insightful for battling the Zika virus or
engineering a safer car or unleashing the powers of silicon than
are the minds of the force-wielders. 177 Their intellectual abilities
set the ceiling on that society’s potential. 178
We might thus cast the difference between the original
Lockeans and Rand as follows. First-wave Lockeans claimed that
a coerced belief cannot be authentic. When adopted due to
pressure from the magistrate’s sword, a person’s “conclusions”
are not truly his. (And this is the nub that the critics challenge.)
Rand’s claim, by contrast, is that a coerced belief cannot be
rational. It cannot be a means of cognition. For it cannot stand
on a full logical reckoning with all the relevant evidence, but only
with that portion of evidence that escapes the censors’ scissors.
A person’s conclusion about a given topic might be rational
within the narrow parameters of the information he is permitted
to consider, but such a shrunken, distorted image of reality cannot
yield knowledge of reality. Yet that is what human well-being
depends on. No fact is extinguished by being misrepresented.
Withholding information about Zika does not change what people
need to know to avoid it or what researchers need to know to treat

176. Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 983, 984 (1987).
177. See Trevor McAllister-Day, UW Researchers Make Progress Fighting Zika, THE
DAILY
OF
THE
U.
OF
WASH.
(Oct.
11,
2016),
http://www.dailyuw.com/science/biology_and_medicine/article_07863950-8e90-11e698ab-03dc2962cbc9.html [https://perma.cc/SGR8-QUYF]; Ezra Dyer, Why Cars Are Safer
Than
They’ve
Ever
Been,
POPULAR MECHANICS
(Sept.
11,
2014),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a11201/why-cars-are-safer-than-theyve-ever-been17194116/ [https://perma.cc/N4UM-8ERL].
178. See RAND, FOR THE NEW INTELLECTUAL, supra note 167, at 134-35; RAND, The
Objectivist Ethics, supra note 84, at 25-26; RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at
17.
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it. Whereas for Lockeans, then, it is salvation that requires a free
mind, for Rand, it is life, humans’ ability to survive and flourish.
Only a mind that is uninhibited by force in its pursuit of evidence
and logic can answer the challenges that human well-being
naturally presents.

V. CONCLUSION
Clashes between religiously inspired political ideologies as
well as demands for religion-based exemptions from certain laws
have, over the past several years, inflamed debates over religious
freedom. What is its meaning? What is its scope? My contention
is that we cannot understand what religious freedom properly
protects until we understand why it protects—its basic
justification and its value. The inadequacy of reigning accounts
is evidenced by the ceaseless stream of precarious balancing acts
that only temporarily quiet conflict.
I have argued that an important line of support for religious
freedom raised by John Locke, John Milton, and other
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century thinkers has been too
casually dismissed by contemporary scholars. While their
analysis was far from perfect, the Lockeans advanced the debate
over religious freedom to more fundamental and more instructive
territory concerned with the very nature of rational thought. What
the Lockeans help us appreciate is that the propriety of religious
freedom is not sui generis; it is not rooted in a distinct value of
religion. 179 Rather, it lies in the nature and needs of the human
mind. Building on the Lockeans’ advance, Ayn Rand has more
recently argued that freedom is the precondition of man’s ability
to exercise his rational faculty and, thereby, gain knowledge.
Accordingly, the case for religious freedom is part of the deeper
and wider case for intellectual freedom. Its value stems from the
value of a free mind. 180
The Lockeans argued that a government’s instruments of
physical force cannot deliver intellectual results. While a
government can declare certain ideas to be true, impose penalties

179. This was not necessarily all of their intention, but it is the implication and the
lesson of their arguments.
180. See SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 52-52; Rand, Man’s Rights, supra
note 143, at 320-33; PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 311 (discussions of force); Wright, supra
note 83, at 43-79.
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for dissent, and thereby incentivize people to say what it wants
them to say and to act as it wants them to act, it cannot, by these
means, transform people into true believers. What Rand adds,
more exactly, is that physical tools cannot make those who are
coerced rational believers. Such methods cannot make a person
understand that which reason shows.
In the larger scheme of things, this is what most matters.
Human life requires the satisfaction of certain needs; knowledge
is required to be able to meet those needs. If our ultimate aim is
to advance human well-being, getting people to believe and act as
a given government decrees does no good. It might accomplish
what particular rulers want, but that, in itself, has no objective
value. 181 Coerced intellectual conformity is not a viable route to
progress.
Why does this matter? If we do not understand the basis of
religious freedom, we will not understand its proper application—
exactly what the law should protect, in specific disputes. The
consequences redound to everyone, not only the religious.
Misunderstandings
of
religious
freedom
reflect
misunderstandings of freedom. When “religious freedom” is
warped to assume unwarranted dimensions, rightful freedom
suffers. An erroneous notion of religious freedom can only be
respected by means that encroach on others, as other individuals
are made to provide the time off, for instance, or to pay for the
medical insurance or to lose the limbs in fighting the wars that
religious citizens object to. Some people’s freedom will be
wrongly denied in order to accommodate the beliefs of the
religious.
Further, the repression of religion, by obstructing a person’s
exercise of reason in the ways that we have examined, will
naturally require wider repression and inflict wider damage.
Ideas are interrelated.
Because an idea carries logical
implications, the affirmation or rejection of any one idea
inescapably carries implications concerning others—concerning
their truth, their relevance on a given issue, their relative weight

181. It cannot make the rulers’ ideas true. If some of them are true, it cannot make
people understand those ideas. And it cannot make beliefs that are adopted at the point of a
gun (to avert force) rather than by means of independent inference a sound basis for
individuals’ beliefs, for individuals’ actions, or for government policy.
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in supporting or weakening other hypotheses, and so on. 182 That
the bridge is rickety entails that anyone concerned with safety
should use it with caution. That the daily consumption of red
wine has this effect, that gun control has that effect, that the
biopsy shows this quality, each conceivably carries consequential
implications for other beliefs and sensible actions.
Given the inherently relational character of ideas, for a
government to enforce a particular religious creed (or any
intellectual doctrine, for that matter) will require repressors to
confine people much more tightly than we might initially
suppose. The study of geology can throw into question religious
doctrines concerning the origin of the universe; the study of
physics can throw into question religious doctrines concerning
miracles or an afterlife. Certain conclusions in biology or human
psychology threaten religious doctrines about male-female
relationships or marriage or women in the workplace or women
driving cars.
In short, to uphold a particular orthodoxy, it is not simply
that the Catholic may not study the teachings of Calvin, for
example. He should not study anything that might threaten his
embrace of the anointed orthodoxy. Thus religious repression
naturally bleeds into other areas. Even if a regime’s laws
officially address only inquiry concerning a specific religion,
their effect will extend to encompass inquiry about related
matters—and about matters related to those questions, and other
matters related to those, and so on. To be safe, the individual
should avoid all such temptations and the state, if it is serious
about its mandated orthodoxy, should not allow exposure to such
temptations. 183 On the repressors’ premise that some ideas must
be accepted no matter what—regardless of what the evidence and
logic indicate—the safest course is for the individual not to
entertain any ideas in a dangerous neighborhood and for the state
not to permit him to entertain such ideas.

182. On knowledge as interconnected, see AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION TO
OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY 10 (Harry Binswanger & Leonard Peikoff eds., 1979);
PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 121-41; HARRY BINSWANGER, HOW WE KNOW: EPISTEMOLOGY
ON AN OBJECTIVIST FOUNDATION 194-95, 198 (2014); RAND, THE BEST OF HER Q&A,
supra note 100, at 32-33.
183. It should limit the “occasion” of sin. Lots of fruit on the tree of knowledge will
have to be forbidden.
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Policing the orthodox is full-time work. For all manner of
ideas stand to threaten it. If religious repression is to be effective,
its subject matter cannot be contained.
The upshot is, religious beliefs are not the only casualty of
religious repression.
Because such repression is, more
fundamentally, an obstruction of the rationally functioning mind,
it stifles all kinds of thinking about all kinds of subjects.
Correspondingly, anyone who values rational inquiry and
knowledge needs to understand the value of religious freedom.
Only with an accurate grasp of its basis can we properly respect
it and preserve that value—and, correspondingly, the value of all
freedom.

